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Professor Greenberg is responding to an earlier article by Grasmick and Green,
"Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval, and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal
Behavior," 71 J. Grim. L. & C. 325 (1980). Professor Grasmick then ofers a
rejoinder to Professor Greenberg's critique.
THE EDITORS
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN SURVEY
RESEARCH ON THE INHIBITION OF
CRIME*
DAVID F. GREENBERG**
In a recent article, Grasmick and Green analyze the relationships
they observe in their sample between scales for L = threat of legal pun-
ishment, S = threat of social disapproval, M = moral commitment to
legal norms, Ip = self-reported past involvement in illegal behavior,
and If = estimated future involvement in illegal behavior. The authors
interpret their data on the basis of an assumed underlying causal model
in which L, S, and M each influence I, and If. Their findings are consis-
tent with the proposition that each of the independent variables inhibits
participation in crime.
Before these findings are accepted, other possible interpretations of
the data must be ruled out. Grasmick and Green make no attempt to
do this. Excluding correlated measurement errors, there are two rival
interpretations to consider. The first is that L, S, and M are not causes
of involvement in illegal behavior, but rather, are consequences of such
involvement. The second is that the relationships are spurious, with
nonvanishing correlations being produced by unmeasured exogenous
causes of the observed variables. Each of these possibilities will be con-
sidered in turn.
* This work was supported by Grant No. 79-NI-AX-0054 from the National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Points of view are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Justice.
** Associate professor of Sociology, New York University; Ph.D. University of Chicago,
1969.
1 Grasmick & Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval, and Intenalization as Inhibitors of
Illegal Behavior, 71 J. GRIM. L. & C. 325 (1980).
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REVERSE CAUSAL ORDER
As operationalized in Grasmick and Green's study, L and S do not
refer to objective features of the threats from legal punishment or social
disapproval, but refer, instead, to subjective appraisals of these threats.
That is quite appropriate in a study of this sort, since it is these subjec-
tive appraisals that are presumed to influence behavior. Yet it is by no
means implausible that these appraisals should be influenced by sub-
jects' participation in illegal activities. Should participants discover on
the basis of their experiences that the consequences of involvement and
apprehension are not as serious as they had previously thought,, they
would revise their estimates of L and S downward, producing a negative
correlation between Ip on the one hand, and L and S on the other.
Moreover, participation in illegal activity could cause people to reassess
their moral standards. Perhaps this happens through psychological
mechanisms for reducing guilt. After-the-fact rationalizations of this
kind are a reasonably familiar phenomenon in everyday life.
Participation may also entail association with others whose values
and beliefs about morality "rub off," leading to a higher tolerance or
even approval of previously disapproved activities. This is the sort of
process postulated by Edwin Sutherland in his famous "differential asso-
ciation" hypothesis,2 but the process can occur as well following involve-
ment in crime as before it. Still another possibility is that moral
commitment to legal norms is eroded when participants learn on the
basis of their experience that the social consequences of their involve-
ment (such as harm to victims) are not as serious as they had previously
believed. The positive reinforcement provided by the violations them-
selves (pleasure from participation) could have the same effect. It is
more difficult to think of a plausible reason why a prediction of future
involvement in crime would be a cause of current assessments of L, S,
and M, and so we will not consider this possibility.
Figure 1 displays a path diagram for a model in which Ip influences
L, S, and M, but is not influenced by them. Using the conventional
rules for path analysis, we can derive consistency conditions that should
hold if the postulated model is correct. These conditions are:
rLiprsi p -= rLS, rslprMip = rsM, and rLipripM :- rLM. Comparing these
predictions with the correlations given in Grasmick and Green's Table
2, we find that none of them are well-obeyed. The three "equalities" we
obtain when we substitute the observed correlations into these three
equations are .236 = .370, .248 = .420, and .168 = .290. Although
the discrepancies are not enormous, they are substantial enough to indi-
cate that the entire pattern of relationships is not due to the effect of IP
2 E.H. SUTHERLAND & D.R. CRESSEY, CRIMINoLOGY 77-98 (10th ed. 1978).
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on L, S, and M. We cannot, however, exclude the possibility that some
part of the relationships originate in this way.
FIGURE 1





The second possibility we must consider is that the relationships
observed are spurious. If this is so, the observed pattern does not reflect
the causal influence of observed variables on one another. Rather, it
reflects the influence of one or more unobserved variables on the mea-
sured variables. It is plausible that spuriousness of this kind should ex-
ist. Variation in participation in illegal activity can reflect variability in
the strength of motivation and in differential opportunities, as well as in
control factors. It does not seem unlikely that some of the personal char-
acteristics that influence motivation and opportunity should also influ-
ence perceived risk and strength of moral inhibitions. We would expect
members of a simple random sample drawn from a city directory (as
was.Grasmick and Green's sample) to differ on a number of variables
(such as age, sex, race, and class) that would influence L, S, M, and Ii.
These same variables would also plausibly influence one's predicted fu-
ture involvement in crime. If, for example, low income causes a person
to steal right now, and he thinks his impoverished economic status is
likely to persist, he would probably predict that he will continue to steal
in the future.
Apart from L, S, and M, we would expect IP to influence If, simply
because people are likely to estimate their future behavior by assuming
that they will continue to do what they are now doing. Social scientists
are generally aware that there is some tendency for involvement in
crime to be consistent; that is, that current violators are more likely to be
violators in the future than are current nonviolators. Lay persons are
[Vol. 721096
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also likely to believe this. The path model corresponding to these as-
sumptions is displayed in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
A MODEL OF PARTIAL SPURIOUSNESS AMONG OBSERVED VARIABLESa
x
L S M Ip if
a The variable X is unmeasured; the remaining variables are defined in the text.
Let us first consider the relationships among the variables L, S, and
M, and Ip. There are four parameters (a, b, c, and d) to be estimated
from the six independent correlations among the variables. These pa-
rameters are the standardized path coefficients (regression coefficients)
for the influence of a postulated single exogenous variable that causes all
four observed variables.3 We will thus have two consistency conditions
that can be used to check the model.
A useful way to carry out these checks is to derive expressions for
each of the parameters. We can derive two such expressions for each
parameter, and can then compare the two estimates. This gives us four
tests, since the two estimates of each parameter should be similar. Only
two of these four tests will be independent. The tests are as follows:
1. We compare a2 = rLsrLip/rsi p = .251 with a2 = rLSrLM/rsM
= .255.
2. We compare b 2 = rLSrsM/rLM = .536 with b 2 = rsMrslp/rMIP
= .590.
3. We compare c2 = rsMrLM/rLs = .329 with c2 = rsMrMip/rsip
= .300.
4. We compare d2 = rsiprLip/rLs = .638 with d2 = rMIprLIp/rLM
= .579.
Here we find the consistency to be quite good. The discrepancies are all
small, well within the magnitude that might be expected on the basis of
3 This single variable can be a composite of the conceptual variables that enter our theo-
ries. Moreover, no special assumption about the functional form of this composite need be
made; in particular, it need not be linear.
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sampling fluctuations. This evidence is consistent with there being no
influence of L, S, M on Ip.
Now let us consider the relationships involving If. We have two
additional parameters to estimate (e and f), and four correlations to use
in estimation. Thus there are two consistency conditions. These can be
taken to be
rLif/rsIf = a(e+df)/b(e+df) = a/b,
rsif/rMif = b(e+df)/c(e+df) b/c.
To check these equations, we use the mean values of the estimates for a,
b, and c obtained earlier, and the observed values of the correlations.
The first equation proves to be extremely well-obeyed, but the second
equality is substantially violated. This tells us that the model is inade-
quate and must be revised.
A parsimonious revision of the model will leave the relationships
among L, S, M, and IP intact, but alter the relationships among these
variables and If. We can do this by permitting L, S, and M to influence
If with respective path coefficients g, h, and k (assuming that the reverse
causal ordering is substantively implausible). The path diagram for this
model is displayed in Figure 3. With five coefficients (e, f, g, h, and k) to
be estimated on the basis of four correlations, the coefficients are under-
identified. Unless additional information is brought to bear, we cannot
obtain unique estimates of the parameters.
FIGURE 3
COMPLEX CAUSAL MODEL FOR CRIME INVOLVEMENT
AND INHIBITORS
x
a db c 
e
L S M I
g h kf
If
Perhaps the most plausible identifying restriction we can make
would be that e = d. This says that the effect of omitted exogenous
variables on future involvement in crime is the same as their effect on
present involvement in crime. On the basis of this assumption we can
[Vol. 721098
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use the expressions rLIf = ae+g, rsif -- eb+h, rMif = ec+k,
ripIf = ed+f to estimate g = .05, h=.075, k = -. 11 and f = .10. Only
moral commitment to legal norms reduces anticipated future involve-
ment in crime, and its effect is quite small. Although it is counter-intui-
tive to find that the threat of legal punishment and of social disapproval
increase anticipated involvement in illegal behavior, the effects are ex-
tremely small and could represent sampling error.
The sensitivity of these estimates to the assumption that e = d can
be ascertained by making alternative assumptions about the value of e.
Since it is highly unlikely that instantaneous exogenous variables would
affect anticipated future involvement in crime more strongly than pres-
ent involvement, we can restrict ourselves to the range between 0 and d.
When e = -. 6 instead of -. 78 (the value of d), we find g = -. 04,
h = -. 06, k = -. 21 and f = .25. Here, legal threat, social disap-
proval, and moral commitment all have the expected sign, but only the
latter is nontrivial in magnitude. In the extreme (and implausible) case
where we set e = 0, we find g = -. 34, h = -. 51, k = -. 55 and
f = .71. Here the estimates are more substantial. We note that in all
instances the threat of legal punishment is a less effective inhibitor of
anticipated future illegality than the threat of social disapproval or
moral commitment to legal norms. The magnitude of these influences,
as estimated from this model, though, is somewhat sensitive to the as-
sumptions made about the relative magnitude of the parameters d and
e. Some estimates are miniscule while others are more substantial. The
data themselves provide no way of checking these assumptions, leaving
the question of crime inhibition up in the air.
CONCLUSION
Our re-analysis of Grasmick and Green's data makes clear that
their conclusions about the inhibition of illegal behavior are not war-
ranted. Their data do not establish that the threats of legal punishment
or of social disapproval inhibit self-reported illegal behavior. Nor do
they demonstrate that moral commitment to legal norms discourages
illegality. Although the data are certainly consistent with the interpre-
tation Grasmick and Green have given them, they are also consistent
with plausible rival hypotheses.
Our examination of these rival hypotheses showed that the only one
which could be ruled out as inconsistent with the data was the hypothe-
sis that involvement in crime is the sole systematic cause of the various
inhibition variables. The data were consistent with the assumption that
an omitted exogenous variable influences these inhibition variables and
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past criminality, with no causal influences among these measured vari-
ables.
The situation with regard to predicted future involvement in ille-
gality proved to be more complex. Here a model of complete spurious-
ness due to an omitted exogenous variable was inconsistent with the
data, even when past criminal involvement was utilized to predict fu-
ture involvement. When the model was revised to allow for the possible
influence of the supposed inhibiting variables on future involvement in
crime, the model proved to be under-identified. Precise values of the
parameters representing the strength of these influences could not be
obtained without using ad hoc assumptions.
This inability to identify the model means that we were not able to
establish that any appreciable degree of crime inhibition originates with
the variables Grasmick and Green set out to study. Nor were we able to
exclude such inhibition. The precise nature of the relationship between
past involvement in crime, anticipated future involvement, and the pre-
sumed inhibiting variables cannot be determined on the basis of the sort
of data Grasmick and Green have collected (that is, cross-sectional data)
without ad hoc assumptions which come from outside the data them-
selves. At present there is no sound theoretical or empirical basis for
such assumptions. Under these circumstances no statistical sleight-of-
hand can answer the question Grasmick and Green believe they have
answered. For this purpose, longitudinal data are needed.
Several years ago, the problems with dealing with spuriousness and
uncertainty in causal direction among variables in deterrence research
were highlighted by Nagin, and Fisher and Nagin. 4 Although these au-
thors discussed these problems in the context of geographically aggre-
gated official data, they are no less relevant to the analysis of
unaggregated survey data. While Grasmick and Green have moved the
study of the social control of crime forward by refining the indicators
used in this sort of research, their inattention to plausible alternative
interpretations of their data, and methods for distinguishing among
them, render their work methodologically primitive, and its conclusions
suspect.
Since the issues raised here have been generally neglected in survey
research on crime deterrence,5 the thrust of the Nagin-Fisher analysis is
4 Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCA-
PACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 95 (A.
Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as DETERRENCE AND INCAPACI-
TATION]; Fisher & Nagin, On the Feasibility ofIdenti'ing the Crime Fwntion in a Simultaneous Model
of Crime Rates and Sanction Levels, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra, at 361.
5 See Anderson, Chiricos & Waldo, Formal and Informal Sanctioms: A Comparison of Deterrent
Effects, 25 SOC. PROB. 103 (1977); Meier & Johnson, Deterrence as Social Control: The Legal and
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worth underscoring here. In the absence of a model that includes all
appreciable influences on crime and social control variables, estimates
for the effect of social control variables on crime will be biased. When
models of this kind embody reciprocal causal relationships, as they gen-
erally will, ordinary least squares regression estimates will also be biased,
and simultaneous equation methods must be employed. The parameter
restrictions needed to carry out such methods on the basis of cross-sec-
tional data will frequently be implausible. I have argued elsewhere that
multiwave panel data will permit such simultaneous equations to be es-
timated on the basis of far less restrictive assumptions.6
Thus, what is needed in survey research on the subjective aspects of
the social control of illegality is clear: the formulation of causal models
that incorporate all relevant variables, not just control variables, and a
data-collection design that will permit these models to be estimated
without specification bias. It will rarely be possible to do this with cross-
sectional data.
Extralegal Production of Conformig, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 292 (1977); Silberman, Toward a Teor, of
Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. Soc. RE V. 442 (1976).
6 GREENBERG & KESSLER, LINEAR PANEL ANALYSIS: QUANTITATIVE MODELS OF
CHANGE (1981); Greenberg & Kessler, PaneModels in Criminologv, in MATHEMATICAL METH-
ODS IN CRIMINOLOGY I (J. Fox ed. 1981); Greenberg, Kessler & Logan,A PanelModel of Crine
Rates and Arrest Rates, 44 AM. Soc. REv. 843 (1979).
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